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THE DOCTRINE OF ANCIENT TITLE: UNKNOWN
ORIGINS, UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Ownership of our nation's coastal waters has been a source of con-
stant litigation for the past four decades. Throughout these dis-
putes the Supreme Court has grappled with a host of state claims
that various coastal waters should be classified as the state's in-
ternal waters. Recently, the Supreme Court discussed the newest
addition to the arsenal of theories upon which states have based
their claims, when it considered a claim by Massachusetts based
on the doctrine of ancient title. Ancient title's late arrival into the
coastal delimitation battle is ironic since it is the oldest method of
acquiring territory. Nevertheless, its introduction into a domestic
dispute is controversial, with significant domestic and interna-
tional ramifications. This Comment discusses the origins of an-cie t title do tr ne and ts application to uch state claims. The
Comment takes issue with the Supreme Court's implicit recogni-
tion of ancient title in a domestic dispute, but concludes that thed ctrine is a legitimate vehicl  for re olving in ernationaldispu es.
INTRODUCTION
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
(Territorial Sea Convention or the Convention),1 adopted April 29,
1958, has been the most productive attempt to codify international
law on the ownership of the navigable waters off the world's many
coasts. 2 Since that date there has been a constant search to discover
I. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective September 10,
1964) (hereinafter Territorial Sea Convention].2. International law generally recognizes three distinct sea zones, distinguishable
by the degree of control the contiguous nation may exert over each zone. Nearest to the
coast is the zone referred to as inland or internal waters. The contiguous nation may
exercise the same degree of sovereignty over its internal waters as it does over the land
within its borders, including the right to exclude foreign traffic through and above thiszone. Beyond the internal waters is the territorial or marginal sea, which begins at the
seaward edge of the internal waters. The contiguous nation may exercise a high degree of
regulatory activity in its territorial sea, but cannot deny foreign ships the right to pass
through these waters. This is referred to as the right of innocent passage. Outside the
territorial sea lies the zone referred to as high seas. No nation may exercise dominion
over the high seas. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 22-23 (1969) [hereinafter
Louisiana Boundary Case].
and actualize the full scope of the first part of article 7(6) of the
Territorial Sea Convention,3 - the so-called "historic bays savings
clause."4 The historic bays savings clause provides an exception to
the rigid methods of delimiting bays which the Convention codifies,
placing the burden upon the proponent of the claim to establish its
applicability.
The Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays
(the Juridical Regime) took a major step in elucidating the historic
bays concept. The Juridical Regime was a project organized by the
United Nations, at the request of the International Law Commis-
sion, 5 to make an in-depth study of the principles of historic waters.
It focused primarily on the historic bays question, and ultimately
elaborated on the doctrine of historic title. This doctrine enables a
state to claim as internal waters that which would normally be de-
fined as territorial sea or high seas by other sections of the Conven-
tion and international law.
In addition to its discussions of historic title - the primary
method by which a state acquires title to waters off its coastline -
the Juridical Regime briefly discussed ancient title.6 Ancient title is
an alternative means of acquiring title to a bay which would not
otherwise be considered a bay under the provisions of the Conven-
tion. The Juridical Regime dedicated several paragraphs to contrast-
ing ancient title with historic title.
On February 25, 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided
the case of United States v. Maine" (Massachusetts Boundary
Case). The question before the Court was whether Nantucket Sound
qualified as internal waters8 of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act of 1953.9 The United States
3. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(6).
4. United States v. Maine, Report of Walter E. Hoffman, Special Master, May
24, 1985 (October Term 1984, No. 35, Original) at 7 [hereinafter Report of the Special
Master]. A Special Master, as a representative of the Court, is one to whom a matter is
referred to hear and report findings of fact and conclusions of law.
5. Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, [1962] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143/1962 [hereinafter Juridical Regime].
6. Id. at 12.
7. 106 S. Ct. 951 (1986) [hereinafter Massachusetts Boundary Case].
8. Classification as internal waters gives a state the right to regulate surface and
air traffic as well as the right to exploit the subsurface and subsoil resources of the inter-
nal waters, including the power to sell, lease and tax. See Comment, The Doctrine of
Historic Bays: Applying an Anachronism in the Alabama and Mississippi Boundary
Case, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 763, 763-64 (1986).
9. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1982), con-
firms to each state title to and ownership of the lands beneath the navigable waters
within state boundaries. The Act also confirms to the state a seaward boundary three
geographical miles distant from its coastline. A state bordering the Gulf of Mexico, how-
ever, may be entitled to an historic seaward boundary beyond three geographic miles and
up to three marine leagues (nine geographic miles) distant from the coastline. United
States v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 93, 94-95 (1985) [hereinafter Alabama and Mississippi
[VOL 24: 769, 1987] The Doctrine of Ancient Title
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
claimed that these waters were partly territorial sea and partly high
seas. The history of the dispute is a long one. It originated when the
parties filed a Joint Motion for Supplemental Proceedings to the
original case1° to determine the location of the Massachusetts coast-
line."1 After the Supreme Court appointed Walter E. Hoffman as
Special Master, the parties agreed to a partial settlement.12 The sta-
tus of Vineyard Sound and Nantucket Sound, "a dispute which gave
rise to extensive hearings before the Special Master," was left un-
resolved.1 3 The Special Master ruled that Vineyard Sound was an
historic bay and therefore a part of Massachusetts' internal waters,
but that Nantucket Sound was not part of Massachusetts' internal
waters - the latter decision to which the Commonwealth took ex-
ception. Although admitting that the doctrine of historic title was
inappropriate to support its claim, Massachusetts continued to assert
its claim based on the doctrine of ancient title.'
4
The Supreme Court had never been faced with a claim to
coastal waters based on the doctrine of ancient title.'5 Because
the case could be resolved on grounds other than the doctrine
of ancient title,' 6 the Court was not forced to affirm or deny its
Boundary Case].
10. In 1969, the United States invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
in an action to quiet title to the Atlantic Coast Seabed. United States v. Maine, 395 U.S.
955 (1969). In 1975, the Court affirmed the title of the United States to the seabed
outside a zone three miles from the coastline. The states' title to the seabed three miles
off the coastline was affirmed. United States v. Maine, 423 U.S. 1 (1975). See also
United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975), which reserved jurisdiction invocable by
any party with the filing of a motion with the Supreme Court for supplemental proceed-
ings; Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 952, n.1.
11. Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 952.
12. The settlement was approved by a supplemental decree of the Court in United
States v. Maine, 452 U.S. 429, 429-30 (1981).
13. Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 953.
14. Id.
15. id.
16. The question of the validity of the doctrine of ancient title and its applicabil-
ity to the claims of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts were extensively discussed by
the Special Master. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 24-66. The Special
Master explicitly recognized the existence and applicability of the doctrine of ancient
title, thoroughly analyzing Massachusetts ancient title claims to both Vineyard Sound
and Nantucket Sound in his Report. Id. The Master concluded "that Massachusetts
ha[d] met its burden of proof" regarding ancient title, with respect to Vineyard Sound.
Id. at 61. The Special Master rejected Massachusetts' claim to Nantucket Sound, under
all theories, including ancient title. Id. at 64-66. The Commonwealth took exception to
the Special Master's ruling that Massachusetts must prove its title by "clear beyond
doubt" evidence of ancient title to the waters and seabed of Nantucket Sound. United
States v. Maine, Exception of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Supporting Brief
to the Report of the Special Master (October Term 1985, No. 35, Original) [hereinafter
validity.17 The Special Master, however, had relied on ancient title in
evaluating Massachusetts' claims to Vineyard Sound and Nantucket
Sound.18 Hence, despite the Court's unwillingness to discuss the "va-
lidity of and any limits to the 'ancient title' theory," 19 the Court's
use of the Special Master's analysis in its opinion makes inroads to-
ward a judicial application of the doctrine.
This Comment attempts to put ancient title into perspective, now
that the Supreme Court specifically has acknowledged its existence,
if not its validity. The first section of this Comment briefly summa-
rizes the methods of delimiting internal waters of states from territo-
rial sea and high seas under the Territorial Sea Convention.20 The
second part of this Comment examines the doctrine of ancient title
and its corrollary, the doctrine of historic title, including the internal
logic which demands recognition of both doctrines, if either is valid.
Finally, this Comment examines the significance of applying ancient
title to a domestic coastal dispute and discusses whether the separa-
tion of powers doctrine should require the judiciary to defer to the
federal legislature on such issues.
RECOGNIZED METHODS FOR DETERMINING INTERNAL WATERS
The modern era of defining internal waters began with the Terri-
torial Sea Convention.2 Article 1 states that "[t]he sovereignty of a
State extends, beyond its land territory and its internal waters, to a
belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea."22
"Waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea
Exception of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts]. Therefore, the Supreme Court's in-
quiry was confined to the correctness of the "clear beyond doubt" standard. Massachu-
setts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 952.
17. Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 960, n.20.
18. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 24-66.
19. Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 960, n.20.
20. "Delimitation is the process of designating and enclosing a body of water as
inland or internal waters." Comment, supra note 8, at 767. Over the years, many meth-
ods of delimitation of internal waters have been used, "including the doctrine of inter
fauces terrarum [county waters], the 'cannon-shot' rule, the range of vision from head-
land to headland rule, the six-mile and ten-mile rule," and the current twenty-four mile
rule. Id. at 767-68.
21. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 1. In 1967, the Supreme Court
ruled in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), that the federal government
had exclusive rights to the lands underlying the coastal waters seaward of the low water
mark on the coastlines. In 1953, Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1315 (1982), which effectively overruled the Supreme Court's holding in United
States v. California. Subsequently, the Court decided to apply the rules codified by the
Convention in order to maintain a consistency between domestic and international
boundaries, and because the Convention provided what the Court regarded as the best
set of rules. Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. 11, 21, 35 (1969); United States v.
California, 381 U.S. 139, 163-65 (1965); Masrachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S.Ct. at
954.
22. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. I(I).
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form part of the internal waters of the State. ' 23 The Supreme Court
has relied particularly on the Convention in fixing the coastline of
the United States.24 "The Supreme Court has concluded that the
Convention provides 'the best and most workable definition available'
for defining the extent of internal waters, including bays."'2 5 In elect-
ing to follow the Convention, the Court has given priority to the pro-
position that the United States should have a single coastline for
both domestic and international relations.2 The Convention has
propagated three basic rules and one exceptional rule for defining
the internal waters of states: normal baselines,27 straight baselines,28
baselines of bays,29 and historic bays.30
Normal Baselines
The most basic of rules for determining internal waters is the nor-
mal baseline method.31 Article 3 of the Territorial Sea Convention
states, with express exceptions, that "the normal baseline for mea-
suring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along
the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the
coastal State."3 2 From this basic definition, the Convention elabo-
rates on constructing normal baselines regarding various geological
phenomena.
A baseline can be drawn as a straight line "across the mouth of
[a] river between points on the low-tide line of its banks," when it
flows into the sea.3 3 An island's baselines are determined in the same
manner as mainland baselines.3 4 "Where a low-tide elevation
35 is sit-
uated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the
23. Id. art. 5(l).
24. See Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 93. See also United States
v. California, 381 U.S. at 161-67; Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 470 U.S. at
93.
25. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4 at 5 (citing Lousiana Boundary
Case, 394 U.S. at 21 and United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 163-65).
26. Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 470 U.S. at 93; United States v.
California, 381 U.S. at 165.
27. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 3.
28. Id., art. 4(1) and accompanying text.
29. Id., art. 7.
30. Id.
31. Id., art. 3.
32. Id.
33. Id, art. 13.
34. The Territorial Sea Convention defines an island as "a naturally-formed area
of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high-tide." Id., art. 10(1).
35. "A low-tide elevation is a naturally-formed area of land which is surrounded
by and above water at low-tide but submerged at high tide". Id., art. 11(1).
territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on
that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth
of the territorial sea."3 Other guidelines for atypical formations are
provided by the Convention.37
Straight Baselines
The second method of delineating the internal waters of a state is
the "straight baseline" method.38 The straight baseline method was
adopted by the Territorial Sea Convention as a codification of a deci-
sion by the International Court of Justice. 8 A state may elect to use
the straight baseline system when there are either deep indentations
or a fringe of islands along its coast."° The choice of straight base-
lines must be shown clearly and publicized on official coastal
charts."1 These baselines cannot "cut off from the high seas the terri-
torial sea of another State." 42 Using straight baselines allows a na-
tion to circumvent the twenty-four mile closing line rule of article
7.43 When a nation, however, elects to apply the straight baselines
method in lieu of normal baselines, article 5(2) of the Convention
requires that foreign vessels be given a right of innocent passage
36. Id.
37. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 6.
38. Article 4(1) of the Territorial Sea Convention states:
I. In localities where the coast line is deeply indented and cut into, or ifthere is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method
of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines
must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the r6-
gime of internal waters.
3. Baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless light-houses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been
built on them.
4. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under the provisionsof paragraph I, account may be taken, in determining particular baselines, of
economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the impor-
tance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage.
5. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a
manner as to cut off from the high seas the territorial sea of another State.6. The coastal State must clearly indicate straight baselines on charts to
which due publicity must be given.
Territorial Sea Convention, supra note I, art. 4.
39. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.C.J. 116 (1951) [hereinafter Anglo-Norwe-
gian Fisheries]. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that the Norwegian sys-tem of straight baselines was not a violation of international law, and that Norway wasentitled to internal waters rights over a group of bays based on their long use of this
method of delimitation.
40. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(1).
41. Id., art. 4(6).
42. Id., art. 4(5).
43. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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through affected waters." This rule allows foreign vessels to continue
to navigate waters that otherwise would be closed, while allowing the
claiming nation all other vestiges of sovereignty.
The Supreme Court has ruled that decisions regarding the proper
implementation of straight baselines on the United States coastline
are reserved for the federal government.45 The individual states can-
not make decisions implementing straight baselines:46 The Supreme
Court has reasoned that for states to be able to implement straight
baselines on an individual basis consequently would give them the
power to expand United States borders, a power reserved to the fed-
eral government.47
Baselines of Bays and Historic Bays
The third set of the Territorial Sea Convention's rules for deter-
mining internal waters contains the rules for determining the base-
lines of bays.48 Article 7 of the Convention provides separate rules
44. Article 5(2) of the Territorial Sea Convention states:
Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with article 4 has
the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been con-
sidered as part of the territorial sea or of the high seas, a right of innocent
passage, as provided in articles 14 to 23, shall exist in those waters.
Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(2).
45. The United States Constitution vests in Congress the "[plower to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This power is without
limitation. Neither the courts nor executive agencies can proceed contrary to an act of
Congress in this area of national power. United States v. California, 332 U.S. at 27.
46. United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 168; Alabama and Mississippi
Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 72.
47. United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 167-68. Only the federal government
has the power to expand territory of the United States. Hence, only the federal govern-
ment can elect to use straight baselines. See id. at 168.
48. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 1, art. 7. Article 7 states:
1. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single
State.
2. For the purposes of these articles, a bay is. a well-marked indentation
whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain
landlocked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An
indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large
as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across
the mouth of that indentation.
3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying
between the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line
joining the low-water marks of its natural entrance points. Where, because of
the presence of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-
circle shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the
lines across the different mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be in-
cluded as if they were part of the water areas of the indentation.
for bays whose natural entrance point low water marks are less than
twenty four nautical miles apart,49 and bays whose natural entrance
point low-water marks are separated by more than twenty-four nau-
tical miles.50 Article 7 does not apply, however, where the straight
baseline system of article 4 of the Convention is used.51
To qualify as a bay for the purposes of article 7, the coastline
involved must be entirely within one state5 2 and satisfy the semi-
circle test.53 If an indentation qualifies as a bay under article 7(1)
through 7(3), articles 7(4) and 7(5) of the Convention allow it to
have a closing line up to twenty-four nautical miles, with the waters
landward of that line being internal waters,5 4 and the waters imme-
diately seaward being the territorial sea. When the natural entrance
points are less than twenty-four nautical miles apart, the entire bay
may be classified as the internal waters of the state.55 If the natural
entrance points are separated by more than twenty-four miles, the
state may draw a straight baseline of twenty-four nautical miles"within the bay . . . enclos[ing] the maximum area of water that is
possible with a line of that length." 56
Article 7 of the Convention also contains an exception for what it
describes as "historic bays."'57 Although historic bays are not defined
by the Convention, 8 the Supreme Court has relied on the Juridical
Regime to shed light upon this concept when asked to decide dis-
putes which have risen between the states and the federal
government.59
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance
points of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn
between these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be
considered as internal waters.
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance
points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four
miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maxi-
mum area of water that is possible with a line of that length.
6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called "historic" bays, or in
any case where the straight baseline system provided for in article 4 is applied.
Id., art. 7.
49. Id., art. 7(4).
50. Id., art. 7(5).
51. Id., art. 7(6).
52. Id., art. 7(l).
53. Id., art. 7(2).
54. Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 954.
55. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note I, art. 7(4).
56. Id., art. 7(5).
57. Id., art. 7(6). See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text; see generally
Comment, supra note 8.
58. Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 954.
59. It is not unusual for the Supreme Court to apply international law when the
Court deems it appropriate. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423
(1964); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). See generally Sprout, Theories as to
the Applicability of International Law in Federal Courts of the United States, 26 Am. J.
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THE HISTORIC BAY EXCEPTION AND DIPLOMATIC PACIFICATION
The drafters of article 7 of the Territorial Sea Convention refused
to create rigid rules that might exclude from a state's internal waters
bays which pragmatically 0 should be included. The historic bay ex-
ception was intended to be the "catch-all" provision for claims which
more accurately might be called "equitable bays." These are the
bays which the sovereign, its citizens, and perhaps the rest of the
world recognize as the sovereign's internal waters, despite the Terri-
torial Sea Convention's more static rules.6 1
Unfortunately, ex post facto codification of international law -
by an organization whose power to codify derives from diplomatic
accommodation rather than absolute authorization - tends to be
problematic. Established rules must be set broadly enough not to of-
fend the organization's chemistry, yet narrowly enough to retain ef-
fectiveness. These competing concerns tend to produce imprecise
codification, leaving only historical principles and precedent as the
guide for interpreting the new code. One such claim that exemplifies
this inherent dilemma is the Soviet Union's claim in 1957 to the Bay
of Peter the Great adjoining the Sea of Japan. Little or no evidence
exists of a usage sufficient to establish the Soviet claim. The element
of acquiescence is lacking. Yet, in order to preserve the delicate bal-
ance in the international community, this claim was not challenged
broadly.
62
The historic bay exception has not escaped the inherent vagaries
of these diametrically opposed forces. The elements of an historic
bay claim are subject to historical interpretation. They take into con-
sideration the actions of the state asserting the internal waters claim,
as well as the actions of other nations. Ultimately, at the core of the
doctrines which embody historic bays are two methods "of acquisition
INT'L L. 280 (1932).
Note, too, that the Submerged Land Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1982),
governs disputes between the states and federal government over title to and ownership of
the territory off the coastline of the United States. 43 U.S.C. § 1312.
60. Such refusal to create rigid rules, and hence exclude certain bays, was likely
diplomatically expedient for the purpose of gaining sufficient multilateral support for the
article's adoption.
61. The list of waters that might qualify as historic bays is long and subject to
omissions. For a compilation of bays to which historic claims have been made, see U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 1506, 1 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 698-712 (G. Hack-
worth ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as I Hackworth].
62. The United States, France, Germany, Holland, Japan, Sweden and the
United Kingdom all have protested the Soviet claim. For the United States protest, see
37 DEP'T ST. BULL. 388 (1957) and 38 DEP'T ST. BULL. 461 (1958).
of title - original6" and adverse64 possession. These methods are far
more universal and accessible than the doctrines suggested as the
appropriate tests for a state's internal waters claims under the his-
toric bay exception.
In preparing the Juridical Regime, the objectives of the participat-
ing states initially were divided. Some states desired steadfast rules;
others desired flexible principles which derived from individual his-
toric bay claims; and still others wished to establish a list of all his-
toric bays.61 After considerable debate, the delegates decided that
the focus of the study would be to compile an amalgamation of the
international legal principles governing historic waters. The delega-
tion decided to examine a collection of cases of possible historic wa-
ters claims,66 submitted by the states, in order to determine common
principles pervasive in many or all of the cases. A major concern,
however, was discovering a method which would be fair, but would
not accept every state's claim.6 7
The Juridical Regime recognized that it would be difficult to ar-
rive at a uniform set of principles to govern the determination of
historic waters, yet remain faithful to the practices of all the states
which were the source of these principles. The results were certain to
exclude claims which, in part, had formed the basis for the rules. 8
63. Original or nonderivative acquisition of property is the oldest method of ac-
quisition. It involves discovery and occupation, although the degree of occupation re-
quired varies depending upon time and circumstances. See generally, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, PUB. No. 7553, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1028-61 (M. Whiteman ed.
1963) [hereinafter 2 Whiteman]; I Hackworth, supra note 61, at 393-409; 1 J. MOORE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 258-69 (1906).
64. An adverse or prescriptive acquisition of property displaces the claim of own-ership by an owner who is first in time, but who has allowed the adverse possessor to
occupy the claimed territory without protest for a period sufficient to allow the adverse
possessor's claim to ripen to full title. The time element is judged on a case-by-case basis.
See P. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION, 355-
426, 474-78 (1927).
65. Juridical Regime, supra note 5, at 2-5.
66. The term "historic waters" is a concession to those who preferred to discuss
more than just bays, despite the fact that the initial focus of the Commission was to have
been Article 7(6) of the Territorial Sea Convention, which mentions only historic bays.
67. The Juridical Regime states:
The purpose of the study should ... be to discuss the principles of interna-
tional law governing the regime of 'historic waters.' The question then arises
how these principles can be ascertained. The proper inductive method would be
to study the particular case of 'historic waters' and see what common principles
can be abstracted from them. This procedure would, however, seem to require
that the first step should be to establish a collection of cases which would be as
complete as possible. That would mean that the Governments must be ap-
proached with a request to provide information. On the other hand, if not every
governmental claim to 'historic waters' is to be accepted, some principles would
be needed in the light of which the claims could be evaluated.
Juridical Regime, supra note 5, at 5.
68. Theoretically at least, there seems to be a dilemma here: in order to decide
whether a claim to "historic waters is rightful, it is necessary to have principles of inter-
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The solution chosen was to weigh existing claims, previous attempts
to formulate principles, and the commentary of international legal
scholars on the topic. The bulk of these materials already had been
compiled in a United Nations Secretariat Memorandum on "historic
bays." 9 These materials were analyzed and discussed until prelimi-
nary conclusions and propositions were resolved.70 These preliminary
conclusions and propositions became the main text of the Juridical
Regime.
ANCIENT TITLE AND HISTORIC TITLE: A COMPARISON
The Doctrine of Freedom of the High Seas
Historically, the doctrines of ancient title and historic title have
been relatively devoid of bright line tests. In differentiating ancient
title and historic title, however, one bright line does surface - the
doctrine of freedom of the high seas.7 1 "The modern law governing
the high seas has its foundation in the rule that the high seas are not
open to acquisition by occupation on the part of states individually or
collectively. '7 2 The high seas are free for all to use.
The period between the end of the sixteenth century and the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century marked a transition between the
closed and the open sea.73 The doctrine of freedom of the high seas is
associated with the emerging prominence of maritime powers and
the declining strength of states favoring a closed sea. This doctrine
becomes an important dividing line in the historic waters analysis.
national law by which claims can be appraised, but in order not to be arbitrary these
principles must be based on the actual practices of the States."
Id. at 5.
69. Historic Bays, Memorandum by the Secretariat of the United Nations, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.13, reprinted in I United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
Official Records 2 (1958) [hereinafter Secretariat Memorandum].
70. Juridical Regime, supra note 5, at 5-6.
71. Hugo Grotius coined the term mare liberum (open sea) to justify the Portu-
guese monopoly on East Indies trade in the 1600s. See P. JESSUP, supra note 64, at 407.
72. United States v. Maine, Reply Brief of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
to the Report of the Special Master (October Term 1985, No. 35 Original) at 10-11
[hereinafter cited as Reply Brief of the Commonwealth] (quoting I. BROWNLIE, PRINCI-
PLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (2d ed. 1973)).
73. "The 17th Century ... saw a major international debate over the nature of
national sovereignty over the high seas." The English protagonists, arguing for the doc-
trine of closed sea - high seas which could be claimed by a sovereign and closed off to
foreign use or regulated by the claiming sovereign - were John Selden and Sir Mathew
Hale, while Hugo Grotius represented the Dutch, who supported an open sea. "Grotius
argued for total freedom of navigation and seas open to all." Report of the Special
Master, supra note 4, at 29-30.
Historic bay claims can be divided into two groups, one on either
side of this line.7 4 Claims which arise after the emergence of the
doctrine of freedom of the high seas are subject to scrutiny under the
doctrine of historic title; claims which precede the doctrine are sub-
ject to scrutiny under the doctrine of ancient title.75
Historic Title
The prevalent method of establishing a title claim under the his-
toric bays savings clause has been through the doctrine of historic
title, discussed extensively in the Juridical Regime.76 The Juridical
Regime ultimately concluded that three elements were required as
proof of the existence of a valid claim under the doctrine of historic
title. These elements are: (1) authority exercised over the area by
the state making the historic title claim;-(2) a long, continuous and
uninterrupted exercise of authority and usage; and (3) the peaceful
acquiescence 8 of other states.
7 9
Exercise of Authority
The first element to be considered, when determining whether a
state has acquired historic title to waters off its coast, is whether that
state has exercised authority over those waters. Although the con-
cept of authority may seem indefinite,80 the Juridical Regime had
little trouble elaborating a three part test for determining whether a
74. Because a period of many years marked the shift of the prevailing attitude
from a closed sea to an open sea, the dividing line is rather blurred.
75. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 25-26.
76. See generally Juridical Regime, supra note 5.
77. Id. at 13-19. A fourth element, based "on other particular circumstances such
as geographical configuration, requirements of self-defence or other vital interests of the
coastal state" was also considered. Id. at 19. However, it was decided that giving states
"the right to claim 'vital bays' would come near to destroying the usefulness of any
provisions in the Convention regarding the definition or delimitation of bays." Id. at 20.
78. The Juridical Regime was indecisive as to whether other states must acqui-
esce in the assertion of title by the claiming state, or whether an absence of opposition to
the exercise of authority and usage is sufficient. Id. at 13. Subsequent decisions have
sided with the requirement of acquiescence. See Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S.
Ct. at 954; see also United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 189 (1975).
79. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 11-12. The Supreme Court has
modified these three elements to make them applicable to a dispute bewteen federal and
state governments brought under the Submerged Lands Act. First, the claim to a historic
bay must be treated as if it were asserted by the federal government, and opposed by a
foreign nation. Second, both federal and state activities and assertions of sovereignty
against the foreign nation(s) are weighed. Third, disclaimers or disavowals of sovereignty
by the federal government are decisive unless the claiming state can show historical evi-
dence that is clear beyond doubt and which has already ripened because of past events.
See Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 77-79.
80. The Juridical Regime mentions such alternative expressions as "exclusive au-
thority," "dominion," "sovereign ownership," "sovereignty" and "jurisdiction," which
might by synonymous with authority. Juridical Regime, supra note 5, at 13.
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state had exercised authority. 81 The first aspect of this test is the
scope of authority. "[T]he authority which a State must continu-
ously exercise over a maritime area in order to be able to claim it
validly as [an] 'historic [bay]' is sovereignty." '82 Claiming an historic
bay is an assertion that the waters within that bay are a part of the
national domain 83 - a part of the sovereign. Thus, if an historic bay
claim is a claim to sovereignty, the authority exercised, which is a
basis for that claim, must be an act asserting sovereignty. 4 The as-
sertion of sovereignty does not require the state to exercise all the
rights or duties of a sovereign. It merely requires that the state treat
the bay in a similar fashion as the rest of the territory over which it
is sovereign.85
The second part of the "excercise of authority" test is an examina-
tion of the acts by which the authority is exercised. 6 "It is hard to
specify categorically what kind of acts of appropriation constitute
sufficient evidence..." of an exercise of authority.87 A survey of
scholars' views in the Juridical Regime exposed a variety of similar,
if not conclusive, ideas on the necessary acts. Generally, these acts
must be governmentally sponsored public assertions of jurisdiction.
A claim based solely on the acts of private individuals is
insufficient.88
The third and final element deals with the effectiveness of the ex-
ercise of authority. "Sovereignty must be effectively exercised; the
intent of the State must be expressed by deeds not merely by procla-
mations." 89 This element is fairly straight-forward in its definition. It
is not necessary for the state to have taken action to enforce its sov-
ereignty; however, if action was required to maintain its authority
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing 3 G. GIDEL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 625-33
(1934)).
84. Id. at 13.
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting 3 G. GIDEL, supra note 83, at 633).
88. Id. at 15. The Juridical Regime mentions exceptions to the "not solely indi-
vidual acts" standard, which may or may not have been applicable to the decision in the
Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 951. However, such an inquiry is beyond
the scope of this Comment. It suffices to say that significant individual acts were found to
have occurred in the waters of Nantucket Sound, although the Court implied that "the
self-interested endeavors of every seafaring community" do not suffice to establish an
historic bay claim. Id. at 958-59.
89. Juridical Regime, supra note 5, at 14 (citing M. BORQUIN, in MELANGES
GEORGES SAUSER-HALL 43 (1952).
over the bay, such action must have been taken. 0
Continuous Usage
The second element required for a valid claim of historic title is
that the exercise of sovereignty over the claimed area be for a long
and continuous period. 91 Although the amount of time required to
satisfy the "long and continuous period" standard cannot be defined
precisely, the upper limit is certain. Claims made under the doctrine
of historic title originate from exercises of authority and usage which
began after the advent of the doctrine of freedom of the high seas. 2
If a claim originates from a period prior to the doctrine of freedom
of the high seas, the historic title theory may validate the claim;93
however, the less stringent theory of ancient title also would be ap-
plicable to such a claim.94
The primary focus of this element is usage.95 Although many at-
tempts have been made to describe and qualify usage,98 the term
necessarily must remain ambiguous. It is sufficient for the purposes
of this Comment to say that "[t]he activity from which the required
usage must emerge is . . .a repeated or continued activity of [the]
same State. ' 97 The amount of time this usage lasts must be consider-
able, with the advent of freedom of the high seas doctrine as the
upper limit. However, "[i]t must remain a matter of judgement
when sufficient time has elapsed for the usage to emerge."98 Each
case must be examined individually to determine if the circum-
stances constitute a usage. In the words of the Juridical Regime,
"Usage, in terms of a continued and effective exercise of sovereignty
over the area by the State claiming it, is . . .a necessary require-
ment for the establishment of a historic title to the area by that
90. This reference to taking action to maintain authority should be assumed to
mean action against private or domestic threats to the state's sovereignty, since a sepa-
rate element of a valid historic title claim is the acquiescence of other states. See infra
notes 100-104, and accompanying text.
91. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 25 (citing United States v.
Alaska, 422 U.S. at 189).
92. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
93. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 25.
94. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
95. Juridical Regime, supra note 5, at 15.
96. The Juridical Regime includes "continuous usage of long standing [usage
continu et seculaire]" (Institute of International Law 1894). Examples of the definitions
in the Secretariat Memorandum, supra note 69, at 14-15, include: "international usage"
(Institute of International Law 1928); "established usage" (Harvard draft 1930); "con-
tinued and well-established usage" (American Institute of International Law 1925); "es-
tablished usage generally recognized by the nations" (International Law Association
1926); "immemorial usage" (Japanese International Law Society 1926); and "continuous
and immemorial usage" (Schucking draft 1926).
97. Juridical Regime, supra note 5, at 15.
98. Id.
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State."99
The Acquiescence of Other States
The third element required for a valid claim of historic title is the
acquiescence of foreign states.100 Acquiescence in the exercise of sov-
ereignty by the coastal state over the area claimed is necessary for
the emergence of historic title. 1 ' The necessity of acquiescence de-
rives from the status of the high seas as community territory, as op-
posed to ownerless territory. Title cannot effectively be obtained
through mere occupation, because the high seas are regarded as
owned by all states.
A claim by historic title ripens in a manner similar to a claim by
prescription. The state claiming the area is not a lawful owner; this
distinction lies with the community of states. As long as the commu-
nity of states objects to the claim, the claim will never ripen to ma-
turity. Maturity requires acquiescence on the part of the community
of states. 10 2 The exact meaning of acquiescence was the subject of
debate in the Juridical Regime. 03 The argument, however, was nar-
rowly focused with all parties agreeing that inaction on the part of
foreign states is sufficient to permit the emergence of a historic
right. 04
Ancient Title
The oldest method of acquiring territory is discovery and occupa-
tion. During the era of extensive exploration, discovery gave title to
99. Id.
100. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. at 189.
101. Juridical Regime, supra note 5, at 16.
102. The acquisition by historic title is "adverse acquisition," akin to acquisition
by prescription. In other words, title to "historic waters" is obtained by a process through
which the original lawful owners, the community of States, are replaced by the coastal
State. Title to "historic waters," therefore, has its origin in an illegal situation which was
subsequently validated. The validation could not take place by the mere passage of time;
it must be consummated by the acquiescence of the rightful owners.
Juridical Regime, supra note 5, at 16.
The Juridical Regime further notes that although acquiescence might logically imply
consent, this is not the case. If the two were synonymous, acquiescence would imply
recognition of a state's sovereignty over the area, hence no reason would exist to assert
the historic title claim. Additionally, there would be no adverse consequence to a lack of
continuous usage, nor would the length of time be significant to the claim. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. The Juridical Regime suggested ultimately that the third element was
best characterized as the attitude of foreign states toward the adverse claim of the
coastal state asserting title. However, subsequent courts have characterized the element
as acquiescence. See United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. at 189.
the sovereign whose explorers had made the discovery. 10 5 Discovery,
however, yielded only an inchoate title, which required something
more than discovery, such as use and settlement, to perfect. 106 Also,
it was necessary for the government claiming the territory effectively
to exclude the claims of other nations.101
Hence, it was necessary for the claiming nation to make known to
all other nations its intention to act as sovereign. 10 8 Even the Su-
preme Court of the United States has stated that "[t]he power to
acquire territory by discovery and occupation . . . exist[s] as inher-
ently inseparable from the conception of nationality, which comes
not from the Constitution, but from the law of nations."10 9
An historical survey of the law of discovery shows that an evolving
degree of physical presence has been required to perfect title to dis-
covered territory. 1 0 A claim based on discovery and occupation,
therefore, must be judged based upon the law prevailing during the
period the discovery and occupation took place.111 Early claims re-
quire much less physical presence, even a mere formal ceremony of
occupation,1  while subsequent claims require a more substantial oc-
105. Early international law allowed a civilized nation to discover, claim and ulti-
mately settle new territories. The civilized nation's claims superseded any rights uncivi-
lized inhabitants may have had. See generally, I J. MOORE, supra note 63, at 258-69.
106. Id. at 258.
107. The exclusion of all others gave the nation making the discovery the sole right
of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing settlements. Johnson v. M'Intosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); see also 1 J. MOORE, supra note 63, at 259.
108. 1 J. MOORE, supra note 63, at 260. Some authors state the requirements of
(1) making the intention to exercise dominion generally known to other nations, and (2)
occupation, as alternative methods of perfecting a claim based on discovery of unclaimed
lands. However, stating an intention without any affirmative action or presence upon the
territory is not sufficient to maintain a claim according to the majority of scholars. See 1
Hackworth, supra note 61, at 393-409; 2 Whiteman, supra note 63, at 1028-61; and 1 J.
MOORE, supra note 63, at 258-69.
109. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
110. See generally 1 J. MOORE, supra note 63.
Ill. "[l]nternational law underwent profound modifications between the end of
the Middle-Ages and the end of the 19th Century, as regards the rights of discovery and
acquisition of uninhabited regions or regions inhabited by savages or semi-civili[z]ed peo-
ples.. . .[A] juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with
it, and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to
be settled." I Hackworth, supra note 61, at 393 (quoting the Arbitral Award in the
Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83, 100-01 (1932)).
112. Hackworth quotes a study which states in pertinent part that:
throughout . . . a period of several centuries, no state appeared to regard mere
discovery. . . as being in any way sufficient per se to establish a right of sover-
eignty over, or a valid title to, terra nullius. . . .[Miere disembarkation upon
any portion of such regions-or even extended penetration and exploration
therein-was not regarded as sufficient itself to establish such right or title.
Nor did merely giving names to regions [named after their physical features]
have any such results . . . . [T]he term "discovery" . . . may have been in-
tended to include the performance of a formal ceremony of taking possession
.. [lI]n such instances, more had occurred than a discovery in the sense of a
mere visual apprehension. . . .[T]he formal ceremony of taking of possession,
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cupation on the part of the claiming nation." 3 No particular degree
of civilization need be established for territory that is being acquired.
It is merely necessary that the territory be territoria nullius - the
property of no one.
114
Prior to the doctrine of freedom of the high seas, all open seas
were considered territoria nullius."5 The doctrine of ancient title de-
rives from this concept of the seas as sovereignless territory. Al-
though the high seas are considered the property of the community
of nations and not territoria nullius, areas of the sea contiguous to a
claiming nation are still susceptible to claims of sovereignty." 6 Al-
though it seems sensible to apply discovery laws to internal waters,
which are treated no differently than the land territory of a nation,
ancient title might well have been an afterthought to the writers of
the Juridical Regime. Ancient title is mentioned by the Juridical Re-
gime merely to point out that the scope of historic title does not
the symbolic act, was generally regarded as being wholly sufficient per se to
establish immediately a right of sovereignty over, or a valid title to, areas so
claimed and did not require . . . "effective occupation." A right or title so
acquired and established was deemed good against all subsequent claims set up
in opposition thereto unless ... transferred by conquest or treaty, relin-
quished, abandoned, or successfully opposed by continued occupation on the
part of some other state.
I Hackworth, supra note 61, at 398-99 (quoting Keller, Lissitzyn, & Mann, Creation of
Rights of Sovereignty Through Symbolic Acts, 1400-1800, 148-49 (1938)).
113. See I Hackworth, supra note 61, at 404.
114. Hackworth states that:
Areas which are territoria nullius and open to acquisition by Occupation may
consist of:
(1) Uninhabited lands; unless they are unsuitable for permanent habitation
and are being used for the purposes for which they are suitable, or are islands
which are situated within territorial waters, or have been formed by alluvium
from occupied territory.
(2) Lands inhabited by individuals who are not permanently united for polit-
ical action.
(3) Lands which have been abandoned by their former occupants.
(4) Lands which have been forfeited because they have not been occupied
effectively.
(5) Seas that are almost or entirely surrounded by land which fulfills one of
the above conditions.
(6) The belt of the ocean bordering on land which fulfils one of the above
conditions to a distance of at least three marine miles from the shore occupied,
with possible extensions in the cases of bays and straits.
(7) The soil beneath the bed of the open sea - by starting from beneath
territorial waters.
(8) Portions of the open sea adjoining the territorial belt-by accretions to
the neighbouring land.
I Hackworth, supra note 61, at 396-97.
115. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 114, particularly parts (5)-(8).
include the concept of occupation.'17 Occupation,""8 however, is one
of the central elements of a title claim to an area by the doctrine of
ancient title.
Acquiring territory on the basis of occupation requires: 1) the
state to be the first sovereign to make a claim to that particular area
(or the last to have a recognized claim prior to advent of the freedom
of the high seas doctrine); and 2) effective occupation by a standard
contemporary to the claim. A claim based on a recent occupation
would not be accepted under current international law. The doctrine
of freedom of the seas 1 9 establishes a claim on behalf of the commu-
nity of states to all areas which were unclaimed prior to the advent
of the doctrine. Therefore, any claim based on ancient title would
have to originate from an occupation which took place prior to the
advent of the doctrine - a claim that was based on the state's occu-
pying the territory prior to freedom of the high seas. 20
In the United States, claims that date back to discovery and occu-
pation came from the colonial powers: England, France, Spain and
Holland. When the American Revolution took place, the people of
each state, as a political unit, seized title.12 1 In the Massachusetts
Boundary Case, Massachusetts asserted its ancient title claim based
on a seventeenth century English royal charter.
117. Th[e] doctrine that occupation is an original mode of acquisition of terri-
tory but one which is not applicable to the high seas seems to be generally ac-
cepted at the present time. A State could therefore hardly claim an area of
water on the basis of occupation unless it affirmed that the occupation took
place before the freedom of the high seas became part of international law
.*.. T]he State would . . . not assert an historic title but rather an ancient
title right based on occupation as an original mode of acquisition of territory.
The difference may be subtle but should in the interest of clarity not be over-
looked: to base the title on occupation is to base it on a clear original title which
is fortified by long usage.
Juridical Regime, supra note 5, at 12.
118. The Juridical Regime offers two definitions of occupation: "[T]he act of ap-
propriation by a State by which it intentionally acquires sovereignty over such territory
as is at the time not under the sovereignty of another State," and "the taking by a State,
with the intention of acting as owner, of something which does not belong to any other
State but which is susceptible to sovereignty." Juridical Regime, supra note 5, at 12
(citations omitted).
119. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 117.
121. "The English possessions in America were not claimed by right of conquest,
but by right of discovery." They were held "by the King . . . as the representative of the
nation . . ." for whose benefit the discovery was made. "[W]hen the Revolution took
place, the people of each state" in their sovereign character, acquired "absolute right to
all their navigable waters, and the soils under them . Martin v. Waddall, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 367, 409-10 (1842).
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Prior Applications of Ancient Title
The Supreme Court discussed two cases1 22 in which the doctrine
of ancient title was applied.123 In Anglo Norwegian Fisheries, "Nor-
way's primary argument was that it had never accepted a status of
high seas for the waters off its coast, especially the waters lying be-
tween the mainland and the fringing islands . . . known as Skjaer-
gard.' 24 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized that
Norwegian fishermen had fished in these areas "from time immemo-
rial," 125 and that fishermen from other states had been excluded by
the King of Denmark and Norway from a period predating the doc-
trine of freedom of the high seas.126
Thus, although Norway ultimately argued that it had always ap-
plied a straight baseline test to determine its coastline, the underly-
ing premise was that it had exercised dominion and sovereignty over
the waters in question since prior to the inception of any contrary
international law.
An earlier ICJ case also illustrated how ancient title, although not
specifically mentioned by name, has been accepted and applied in
international law. In Annakumaru Pillai v. Muthupayal,127 the de-
fendant was accused of stealing mollusks five miles off the Ramad
coast.128 The ICJ upheld its jurisdiction and the defendant's liability
based on historical evidence validating the state's claim to the waters
from the sixth century B.C. The court stated "that for ages in this
country, [mollusks] and pearl oysters ha[d] been owned and enjoyed
by the sovereign as belonging. . . exclusively to him."'1 29 Since these
belonged to the sovereign, harvesting had always been a state con-
trolled activity.130 The ICJ recognized that claims predating freedom
122. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. at 116; Annakumaru Pillai v.
Muthupayal, 27 Indian L.R. 551 (Madras 1903). Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries led ulti-
mately to the adoption of the straight baseline for bays, discussed in Article 7(6) of the
Territorial Sea Convention.
123. Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 956-57.
124. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 26. Skjaergard or "rock ram-
part" is a chain of 120,000 islands and low-tide formations which fringe the northern
Norwegian coast. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. at 127.
125. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. at 127.
126. Id. at 142.
127. 27 Indian L.R. 551 (Madras 1903).
128. Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 957.
129. Annakumaru Pillai, 27 Indian L.R. at 557; see also Massachusetts Bound-
ary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 957; P. JEssuP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARI-
TIME JURISDICTION 16 (1927).
130. Annakumaru Pillai, 27 Indian L.R. at 554; Massachusetts Boundary Case,
423 U.S. at 25-26.
of the high seas (here dating back to the sixth century B.C.) were
not invalid merely because the law had subsequently changed.131
It is comparatively simple to identify an established ancient title.
Because ancient title is not an assertion of dominion over waters
which are the property of the community of states, a state making
an ancient title claim has a lesser burden than one asserting historic
title. The Special Master noted in the Massachusetts Boundary
Case that "[e]ffective occupation, from a time prior to the victory of
the doctrine of freedom of the seas, suffices to establish a valid claim
to a body of water under ancient title.' 1 32 The element of acquies-
cence is not essential, but evidentiary at best. The requirement of a
peaceful and continuous exercise of sovereignty is significantly less
burdensome than requirements under a claim of historic title.
Adverse Possession vs. Clear Original Title
The major distinction between historic title and ancient title is
that a claim of title based on occupation is one of clear original title,
fortified by long usage. 33 Historic title is prescriptive, resulting from
an adverse claim by the coastal nation. This claim divests the title of
the community of states to the waters in question. States have
claimed, as a part of their nation, waters which would have been
considered part of the high seas under traditional international law.
The element of prescription is essential; the historic considerations
only become relevant when the claim cannot be established by con-
ventional means. Therefore, the claim must rely on an extraordinary
factor, such as an historical right."" "[T]his right essentially takes
the form of a 'validation in the international legal order of a usage
which is intrinsically valid, by the continuance of the usage over a
long period of time.' ,,', Examples of claims based on historic title
are the claims made by Alabama and Mississippi to Mississippi
Sound.3 6
By contrast, ancient title does not require such a divestiture. Prior
to the advent of the doctrine of freedom of the high seas, pre-eight-
eenth century waters were susceptible to claims of sovereignty. 137
131. Annakumaru Pillai, 27 Indian L.R. at 554-57.
132. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 25-26.
133. Juridical Regime, supra note 5, at 12.
134. Some writers have suggested that economic and political necessities also may
establish a claim to a bay, and they have coined the term "vital bay." Such claims,
however, can be linked at least in part to a misreading of Article 7(4) of the Territorial
Sea Convention, which suggests that in using the method of straight baselines, the eco-
nomic interests of a region may be taken into account. This passage may have beenmisapplied to Article 7(6) to derive the vital bay concept. In any case, the vitality of a
bay to a nation is not evidence of usage necessary to establish a prescriptive claim.
135. Juridical Regime, supra note 5, at 8 (citations omitted).
136. Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, 470 U.S. at 93.
137. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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During this period, states routinely claimed title to coastal waters by
right of discovery.138 Assuming these claims were subsequently "for-
tified by long usage," it seems internally logical that ancient title
should be recognized.
The legitimacy of ancient title must derive, in part, from the ac-
ceptance of historic title. Moving beyond the question of the doc-
trine's elements, it does not seem plausible that one could be recog-
nized as a method of acquisition of the high seas without the other's
recognition. After all, the nature of the seas prior to freedom of the
high seas139 implies that, although the seas had no sovereign, they
were susceptible to sovereignty. 140 Therefore, there were two possible
dispositions of title: Either title vested in the community of states via
freedom of the high seas, or, prior to this, it was claimed by a state.
Whether it is expedient for the Supreme Court to recognize an
ancient title or historic title claim is an open question - especially
in light of the international ramifications."' Regardless, both doc-
trines have a logical and historically valid position in international
law. To maintain that a claim by a state may divest the title of the
community of states (historic title), but cannot predate the commu-
nity's claim (ancient title), seems untenable.
4 2
APPLYING ANCIENT TITLE: PRESENT AND FUTURE
The Massachusetts Boundary Case
The concept of occupation, as an original mode of acquisition, is
not alien to United States law.1' Although ancient title has
reemerged as a potentially viable method of claiming title to the
coastal waters of a state, the international legal community has said
little about this doctrine, at least to the extent that it applies to
coastal waters. At one time or another, all territory under sovereign
domain logically must have been taken by this method. In light of
the dearth of precedent, the Supreme Court's discussion of ancient
138. See, e.g., Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 27-28, 38-43 (dis-
cussing whether England took title to the waters of Massachusetts by operation of the
Royal Charters of 1664 and 1691).
139. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
140. See Juridical Regime, supra note 5, at 12.
141. See infra, notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
142. If anything, ancient title suffers from a lack of exposition, in terms of its
elements. Certainly, a claim of original title must be based on some exercise of authority
and usage. If this were not true, all self-proclaimed "rulers of the world" would find
some measure of legitimacy.
143. See supra notes 107-08.
title in the Massachusetts Boundary Case takes on added signifi-
cance, both for domestic and international purposes.
Despite the Court's statement in the Massachusetts Boundary
Case that "the validity of and any limits to the 'ancient title' theory
[would be] reserved for an appropriate case, ' 144 the Court's discus-
sion contains significant implications to future domestic and interna-
tional boundary disputes. The first issue the Court addressed was a
delimitation on the doctrine of freedom of the high seas. 145 The
Court did not find it necessary to choose a cut-off date after which
the community of states asserted its claim based on freedom of the
high seas. It did, however, rule that "effective 'occupation' must have
ripened into 'clear original title,' 'fortified by long usage,' no later
than the latter half of the 1700's. ' ' 46
The Court also seemed to accept the Special Master's foundation
test for an ancient title claim. 47 In rejecting Massachusetts' claim to
Nantucket Sound, the Court's analysis followed the proposition that
" '[e]ffective occupation, from a time prior to the doctrine of free-dom of the [high] seas' is necessary 'to establish a valid claim ...
under ancient title.' -14' The Court also indicated that effective occu-
pation may derive from an "exploitation of the marine re-
sources . ..equivalent to a formal assumption of sovereignty."' 49
Finally, the Court stated its belief that "occupation requires, at a
minimum, the existence of acts, attributable to the sovereign, mani-
festing an assertion of exclusive authority over waters claimed."' 150
Although the Court did not recognize Massachusetts' claim of an-
cient title, the above analysis does provide a framework for future
claims. First, all events necessary for title to ripen must have oc-
curred prior to the mid-1700's. Second, there must have been acts by
the sovereign which assert exclusive authority. Third, intensive and
exclusive exploitation of the coastal region by individual inhabitants
would not suffice as occupation, absent a linkage to a sovereign tak-
ing of the territory. Finally, a state must continue to treat the
claimed territory in a manner consistent with the assertion of domin-
ion over that area.' 5 '
144. Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 960 n.20.
145. Id. at 955.
146. Id. at 955-56 n.ll.
147. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 25-27.
148. Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 956 n.12.
149. Id. at 956.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 959.
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Choice of Law
"The Supreme Court has consistently followed principles of inter-
national law in fixing the coastline of the United States." '152 The
Court has drawn extensively upon the Territorial Sea Convention as
"the best workable definitions available" for evaluating coastal wa-
ters claims.153 The Convention, however, is an international diplo-
matic work, susceptible to the vagaries of political pressure and com-
promise. Whether this is a proper choice of law for domestic disputes
concerning the United States coastline is questionable. Certainly, de-
termining the legal coastline in the same fashion for domestic and
international purposes is a reasonable objective.15 4 Whether this ob-
jective should provide the states with a mechanism for appealing to
the Supreme Court the definition of their legal coastlines is another
matter. Quite possibly, in an attempt to settle a domestic dispute,
the Court may have established precedent that will be applied
internationally.
The Court previously has rejected a state's claim that it had a
right to choose the straight baseline method for delimiting its coastal
waters. It ruled that only the federal government had the power to
make such a decision.1 55 A broad application of this concept - plac-
ing the definition of coastal boundaries solely in the hands of the
federal government - would eliminate the need for judicial review
of domestic coastal disputes. In United States v. California, the
Court was unwilling to allow a state to extend its sovereignty to in-
ternational waters by a domestic judicial assertion of international
law. The Court felt that "unless the Federal Government's responsi-
bility for questions of external sovereignty is hollow, it must have the
power to prevent states so enlarging themselves." '56 Although this
statement deals with straight baselines, matters would be simplified
considerably if it were applied to all coastal water disputes. There
152. Id. at 954. See United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 161-67. The Execu-
tive Branch has consistently challenged the Court's use of the Territorial Sea Convention
in domestic disputes. Id. at 164.
153. Massachusetts Boundary Case, 106 S. Ct. at 954 n.8; see United States v.
California, 381 U.S. at 165.
154. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 5. See supra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text.
155. United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 168. William Howard Taft stated
that in connection with the assertion of territorial jurisdiction by the Executive Branch,
Congress' decisions or the Executive's treaty making power upon such an issue would
bind the courts, but in the absence of either's decision, the President's action is conclusive
with the courts. W. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND His POWERS 118 (1916).
156. United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 161-67.
may be some problems, however, with applying the Convention fordetermining the United States coastal boundary for domestic and in-
ternational purposes, while at the same time recognizing that the re-
sponsibility for questions of external sovereignty lies ultimately in
the hands of the federal government.
The delimitation of United States coastal waters has a direct im-
pact on its territorial boundaries. Determining the boundaries of the
nation is a political question, 157 which lies in the domain of the exec-
utive and legislative branches of government. The judiciary mustlimit itself to a review of the propriety of the executive or legislative
branches' decision to act, and should not concern itself with the sub-
stance of the actions.158 Deference is mandated by both the doctrine
of separation of powers and pragmatic diplomacy.
The Court must defer to the other governmental branches in order
to promote United States foreign relations policy. Decisions by the
Court that are inconsistent with executive policy making can serve
only to hinder the efforts of those charged with our nation's diplo-
macy.159 Foreign nations most certainly will seize on such a decision
to reassert claims to certain waters.' 60 A notable example is Libya's
claim to the Gulf of Sidra.161 Analyzed under the tenets of historic
157. The political question doctrine essentially asserts that certain issues are bestleft to the political branches of government, to the exclusion of the judiciary. The Courtin Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), set forth the criteria for determining political
questions:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question isfound a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to acoordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and man-ageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without aninitial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or theimpossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expres-sing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusualneed for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or thepotentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
158. The separation of powers doctrine asserts that the judicial branch should havea highly limited governmental role and avoid substantive issues handled by the politicalbranches of the federal government. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985).
159. "The conduct of foreign relations of our Government is committed by theConstitution to the Executive and Legislative . . . Departments of the Government, andthe propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject tojudicial inquiry or decision." Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).160. It is not unusual for dicta or footnotes of Supreme Court decisions to beseized upon and applied extensively by subsequent courts and foreign governments. SeeR. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SocIETY 651 (1970).161. For a complete analysis and text of Declaration of October 10, 1973, seeSpinnato, Historic and Vital Bays: An Analysis of Libya's Claim to the Gulf of Sidra,13 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 65 (1983); see also Francioni, The Status of the Gulf ofSirte in International Law, II SYR. J. INT'L L & CoMm. 311 (1984).
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title,162 the Libyan claim clearly fails, since it lacks the element of
acquiescence of other nations."
6 The Court's dicsussion, however, in
the Massachusetts Boundary Case would lend credence to a Libyan
claim that acquiescence is irrelevant, based on the doctrine of an-
cient title. Simply put, the Court may have removed a major obsta-
cle to the establishment of claims that the executive branch would
prefer not to recognize. The Court would indeed be wise to consider
such matters with pen in hand, judicially delimiting its opinions to
domestic disputes.
CONCLUSION
Ancient title, like historic title and the various baseline methods
before it, is a legitimate mechanism for resolving international dis-
putes. It finds its support in international precedent, and conforms to
the greater goal of peaceful and orderly resolution of coastal water
delimitations. However, the Supreme Court's rulings attempting to
provide a unified coastline for domestic and international purposes
pose dangerous problems. The Supreme Court should not allow the
coastal states of the United States to assert ancient title claims
against the federal government. By recognizing states' standing to
assert claims based upon theories of international law and diplo-
macy, the Supreme Court has entered a dangerous arena. The
Court's decision in the Massachusetts Boundary Case is an ill-ad-
vised application of international law, which creates the potential for
a diplomatic backlash. International law, unlike its domestic coun-
terpart, must be sensitive to its non-binding and volatile nature. In-
ternational doctrine must be capable of pacifying a number of sover-
eign states, whose participation is based on congeniality, not
obligation. By contrast, the United States is capable of negotiating
or otherwise enforcing a single unified coastline among its states.
How this is accomplished is of less consequence than the fact that,
unlike matters of diplomacy, it can be done in a binding and conclu-
sive fashion. The Supreme Court must take greater care either to
strictly limit its decisions to domestic application, or to defer to the
executive and legislative branches in determining the limitation of its
coastal waters.
BARRY LAWRENCE RUDERMAN
162. See supra notes 76-104 and accompanying text.
163. For a complete account of the actions of various governments in protest of
Libya's claim, see Spinnato, supra note 161, and Francioni, supra note 161.

